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DEPRIVATION OF CARE: ARE FEDERAL 
LAWS RESTRICTING THE PROVISION OF 
MEDICAL CARE TO IMMIGRANTS 
WORKING AS PLANNED? 
Ryan Knutson* 
Abstract: The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 
has severely limited immigrants' access to medical care. In enacting the 
legislation, Congress stated that immigrants were too great a burden on 
the U.S. medical system and cost the federal government too much. In 
reality, immigrants do not place an unduly high burden on the medical 
system. The Act also limits the autonomy of local medical providers by re-
stricting their ability to provide preventive medical care, care that is better 
for patients’ health and, in the long run, more cost effective. Further 
complicating this issue is that medical providers are often unable to re-
cover complete reimbursement from the federal government because the 
Act authorizes repayment only for services rendered to patients in an 
emergency condition. This note calls for a repeal of the anti-immigrant 
provisions of the Act and suggests that decisions regarding the provision 
of care are best left to medical providers at the local level. 
Introduction 
 After spending over a month at various New York City hospitals, 
Ming Qiang Zhao suffered an unexpected and costly death.1 During 
the summer of 2005, Mr. Zhao, a fifty-year-old Chinese immigrant who 
had been living in New York City for over ten years, began to feel ill.2 
With no doctor and no access to the heath care system, Mr. Zhao 
                                                                                                                      
* Articles Editor, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2007--2008). 
1 See Nina Bernstein, Recourse Grows Slim For Immigrants Who Fall Ill, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 
2006, at A1. 
2 See id. After spending the voyage packed into the cargo hold area of a smuggling 
ship, Mr. Zhao entered the country without documentation in 1993. Id. Mr. Zhao, like 
many of his fellow Chinese immigrants, came to the United States with the hope of provid-
ing a better life for himself and his family back in mainland China. See id. For a thorough 
analysis of illegal Chinese migration, see Zai Liang & Wenzhen Ye, From Fujian to New York: 
Understanding the New Chinese Immigration, in Global Human Smuggling: Comparative 
Perspectives 187, 199–200 (David Kyle & Rey Koslowski eds., 2001). Liang and Ye con-
tend that economic motivations play a large role in Chinese emigration from Fujian prov-
ince, the province with the largest migration outflow. See id. at 191, 199--200. 
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sought the advice of an unlicensed practitioner in Manhattan’s China-
town district.3 Mr. Zhao walked away with three bags of unknown and 
unlabeled white pills that the practitioner claimed were an herb-based 
remedy for high blood sugar, high blood pressure, and insomnia.4 A 
week later, on July 6, Mr. Zhao collapsed in the street.5 
 An ambulance rushed the unconscious Mr. Zhao to the bankrupt 
St. Mary’s hospital in Brooklyn.6 Scheduled to close its doors only 
weeks after Mr. Zhao arrived, St. Mary’s transferred Mr. Zhao to St. 
John’s Hospital in Queens.7 Mr. Zhao’s coma lasted several weeks.8 In 
an attempt to determine the cause of Mr. Zhao’s sudden medical 
emergency, doctors administered a host of diagnostic tests including 
spinal taps, EKGs, and CAT scans, and treated Mr. Zhao with antibiot-
ics, anticonvulsants, and blood thinners.9 Visitors began to hope for a 
recovery when, after three weeks of unconsciousness, Mr. Zhao ap-
peared to respond to his name.10 Despite his improved responsive-
ness, doctors, acting through an interpreter, asked Mr. Zhao’s closest 
confidants if they would agree to a “Do Not Resuscitate” order.11 Mr. 
Zhao’s friends refused.12 On August 9, 2005, as the doctors discussed 
the order again, Mr. Zhao attempted to break free of the tubes and 
oxygen mask attached to his mouth.13 Despite subsequent resuscita-
tion attempts, Mr. Zhao died without uttering a word.14 During his 
combined stay at St. Mary’s and St. John’s, Mr. Zhao’s medical bills 
exceeded $200,000.15 
                                                                                                                      
3 Bernstein, supra note 1. Five years earlier, Mr. Zhao was diagnosed with nasal cancer; 
through successful treatment the cancer was eradicated. Id. Mr. Zhao’s treating physician 
requested that he make routine follow-up visits for the remainder of his life. Id. Because of 
a lack of ability to pay and administrative difficulties at the hospital, Mr. Zhao did not go 
back for check-up procedures. Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. St. Vincent’s Catholic Medical Centers, the parent organization to both St. Mary’s 
and St. John’s, was also in financial ruin and had recently filed for bankruptcy protection. 
See id. 
8 See Bernstein, supra note 1. 
9 Id. The tests revealed diabetes and high blood pressure, though their respective roles 
in Mr. Zhao’s ultimate death were unknown. Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. Bernstein’s story does not shed light on the motivation behind the doctor’s re-
quest for a “Do Not Resuscitate” order. See id. 
12 Id. 
13 Bernstein, supra note 1. 
14 Id. 
15 See id. Mr. Zhao spent a total of thirty-nine days in the intensive care beds at St. 
Mary’s and St. John’s at a cost $5400 per day. See id. 
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 Mr. Zhao’s tragic story highlights the growing problems facing both 
immigrants and health care providers under the current statutory 
framework, a regime that denies most preventive medical care to immi-
grants.16 Unfortunately, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportu-
nity Act of 1996 (PRWOA), along with other federal and state legislation, 
has ushered in a new anti-immigrant era in the United States.17 PRWOA 
severely curtailed immigrants’ access to public welfare benefits by elimi-
nating access to most federal, state, and local benefits, the notable excep-
tion being access to emergency medical care.18 Furthermore, as a result 
of infectious anti-immigrant rhetoric, immigrants like Mr. Zhao fear the 
adverse consequences that may result if they seek out or rely on govern-
mental assistance.19 This fear has, in turn, led immigrants to seek alter-
native forms of care or delay primary care and wait until their health 
                                                                                                                      
16 See Julia Field Costich, Legislating a Public Health Nightmare: The Anti-immigrant Provi-
sions of the “Contract with America” Congress, 90 Ky. L. J. 1043, 1069 (2002) (concluding that 
improvement of immigrants’ access to heath care should be a national priority); Bernstein, 
supra note 1. Unless otherwise specified, the use of the term “immigrant” in this note 
means both undocumented immigrants and those immigrants legally authorized to be in 
the United States. 
17 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (current version at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601--1646 (2000)); 
Daniel Kanstroom, The Better Part of Valor: The REAL ID Act, Discretion, and the “Rule” of Im-
migration Law, 51 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 161, 162 (2006) (arguing the 1996 Republican con-
trolled Congress and President William Clinton fundamentally restructured immigration 
law). Professor Kanstroom argues that two laws, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996, 
placed much of immigration law outside the mainstream of U.S. law. Id.; see Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40, 42 U.S.C.); Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18 U.S.C.). 
18 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act §§ 401, 411. 
Because this note discusses the original PRWOA legislation, subsequent amendments, and 
the current codified version, it is appropriate and helpful to account for this distinction. 
Accordingly, citations including the original public law indicate reference to the original 
legislation, whereas citations including only the U.S. Code indicate reference to the statute 
as it is currently in force. 
19 See Peter Feld & Britt Power, Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid and the Unin-
sured, Immigrants’ Access to Health Care After Welfare Reform: Findings from 
Focus Groups in Four Cities 9 (2000), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/ 
loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=13375 (documenting con-
cerns by legal immigrants that use of government help will affect immigration status or the 
opportunity for citizenship); Bernstein, supra note 1 (noting that Mr. Zhao feared he 
would be deported if the government became aware of his undocumented status). 
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problems become critical emergencies before they seek medical atten-
tion.20 
 Hospitals and medical providers are also struggling under the gen-
eral prohibition on providing preventive care to immigrants.21 Com-
pounding the fact that emergency care is an expensive undertaking, high 
levels of unrecouped medical costs place significant financial pressure on 
medical providers.22 Hospitals that provide emergency care to patients 
who are unable to pay may request reimbursement from state and fed-
eral funds.23 However, because state and federal reimbursement pro-
grams cannot provide complete reimbursement, hospitals and medical 
providers often absorb a significant amount of the cost associated with 
providing emergency care.24 Despite a recent study which illustrates that 
immigrants’ share of total medical costs is less than their population 
share, it is undeniable that immigrants are partially responsible for the 
dire economic picture facing the U.S. medical system.25 
                                                                                                                      
20 See Kathleen A. Maloy et al., George Washington Univ. Med. Ctr., Synthesis 
Report: Effect of the 1996 Welfare and Immigration Reform Laws on Immigrants’ 
Ability and Willingness to Access Medicaid and Health Care Services 31 (2000), 
available at http://www.gwumc.edu/sphhs/healthpolicy/chsrp/downloads/synthesis.pdf; 
see also Mary Chris Jaklevic, This Side of the Ethical Border; Hospitals Feel Duty of Keeping Immi-
grants Healthy Despite Federal Limits, Modern Healthcare, Sept. 3, 2001, at 52, 53 (noting 
welfare reform further exacerbated immigrants’ precarious access to health care). 
21 Nat’l Immigration Law Ctr., Issue Brief: Comprehensive Health Care for 
Immigrants: A Sound Strategy for Fiscal and Public Health 2 (2004), available at 
http://www.nilc.org/immspbs/health/Issue_Briefs/comphealthcare_0404.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Care For Immigrants]. 
22 See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, Fact Sheet: Uncompensated Hospital Care Cost 4 (2006), 
available at http://www.aha.org/aha/content/2006/pdf/uncompensatedcarefs2006.pdf 
(providing national statistics on uncompensated care which reveal that in 2005 $28.8 bil-
lion, or 5.6% of total expenses, were never compensated). Uncompensated care includes 
both charity care (care to those patients for whom a hospital does not expect payment) 
and bad debt (care that a hospital is unable to recoup). Id. Medicare and Medicaid under-
payment is the difference between the cost of the medical services provided and the reim-
bursement received from the state and federal government for providing care. See Am. 
Hosp. Ass’n, Fact Sheet: Underpayment By Medicare and Medicaid 3 (2006), available 
at http://www.aha.org/aha/content/2006/pdf/underpaymentfs2006.pdf [hereinafter Un-
derpayment] (providing national statistics on underpayment of Medicare and Medicaid 
which reveal more than $25 billion in underpayments to hospitals providing Medicare and 
Medicaid services in fiscal year 2005). 
23 MGT of Am., Medical Emergency: Costs of Uncompensated Care in South-
west Border Counties 12--14 (2002), available at http://www.bordercounties.org (click 
on “Report on Uncompensated Emergency Healthcare Costs”; then choose “Full Report 
(pdf)” hyperlink) [hereinafter Uncompensated Care in Southwest Border Counties] 
(discussing state and federal programs that provide reimbursement). 
24 Id. at 47. 
25 Dana P. Goldman et al., Immigrants and the Cost of Medical Care, 25 Health Aff. 1700, 
1708--09 (2006) (concluding that legally residing immigrants and undocumented immi-
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 Although Congress intended to relieve the financial strain on hos-
pitals and medical centers with the passage of PRWOA, in reality, the 
Act imposes significant economic hardships on hospitals and emer-
gency rooms.26 A separate, pre-existing piece of legislation, the Emer-
gency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), requires 
that any hospital that receives Medicaid funding provide appropriate 
screening and subsequent stabilizing care to anyone who enters its 
emergency room doors.27 Thus, the current legal framework forbids 
medical practitioners from providing most preventive care to immi-
grants who fall under PRWOA, yet obliges these same practitioners to 
treat immigrants with emergency medical conditions under EMTALA.28 
As one doctor explained, treating emergency medical conditions that 
could have been prevented through primary care is both “bad medi-
cine” and “bad economics.”29 
 Recently, Congress was forced to recognize the “bad economics” of 
PRWOA’s prohibition on preventive care in its approval of $1 billion of 
additional aid to help defray the increasing costs of providing emer-
gency care to undocumented immigrants.30 The Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) appropri-
ates $250 million per year from years 2005 through 2008 to help defray 
the increased cost of providing emergency medical care to undocu-
mented immigrants.31 Given that Congress’s ultimate goal was to re-
duce the financial burden that immigrants like Mr. Zhao place on the 
                                                                                                                      
grants account for an 8.5% and 1.5% share of medical costs compared to 13.1% and 3.2% 
of the population, respectively). 
26 See 8 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000) (stating that immigrants are not to burden the public bene-
fit system); Jim Yardley, Immigrants’ Medical Care Is Focus of Texas Dispute, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 
2001, at A18 (quoting Dr. Kenneth L. Mattox of Ben Taub Hospital in Houston, Texas that 
emergency treatment can cost upwards of four to ten times as much as primary care). 
27 See Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)--(b) 
(2000). While in theory participation in Medicare and Medicaid is voluntary, in reality 
hospitals cannot afford to opt out of participation. See Underpayment, supra note 22, at 1. 
28 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611, 1621; 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b). 
29 See Yardley, supra note 26 (noting weaknesses of the current statutory regime). Doc-
tors are also compelled to provide care by their own code of medical ethics. See Jaklevic, 
supra note 20, at 52 (indicating that the Hippocratic oath requires doctors to provide 
medical care to all who are in need, regardless of their immigration status). 
30 See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. 
L. No. 108-173, § 1011, 117 Stat. 2066 (to be codified in scattered sections of 26, 42 U.S.C.). 
31 See § 1011(a)(1), 117 Stat. at 2066. MMA provides funding directly to hospitals and 
medical centers with unpaid Emergency Medicaid bills. See § 1011(c)(1), 117 Stat. at 2066. 
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health care system, increased funding for emergency care calls into 
question the efficacy of prohibiting preventive care.32 
 This note will examine the effectiveness of PRWOA, after more 
than a decade of implementation. Part I discusses changing immigra-
tion patterns in the United States and analyzes the impact of these 
changes on the U.S. health care system. Part II outlines the history of 
immigrants’ access to health care. This section begins with a brief 
analysis of the constitutional basis for immigrant access to public wel-
fare benefits and then provides an analysis of the statutory frameworks 
by which immigrants have accessed welfare benefits like medical care. 
Part III explores the legislative history of PRWOA to discern congres-
sional intent, addresses subsequent realted federal legislation, and ana-
lyzes post-PRWOA studies that call into question the effectiveness of the 
Act in light of Congress’s intended goals. Part IV provides a salient ex-
ample of a preventive care program which may result in greater realiza-
tion of Congress’s intent to reduce the medical care costs of immi-
grants. Finally, this note concludes that PRWOA has been an economic 
failure for state and local governments, and thus advocates that in addi-
tion to giving medical practitioners’ greater autonomy to provide pre-
ventive care, the federal government must provide more adequate 
funding to state and local governments. 
I. Immigrants: Numbers and Experiences 
 Over the past thirty years the United States has seen a rapid rise in 
its immigrant population, and, currently, immigration is at the highest 
level in U.S. history.33 According to a recent study of the U.S. Census 
figures, the total number of immigrants in the country increased from 
9.6 million in 1970 to 35.2 million in 2005, an increase of more than 
                                                                                                                      
32 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1611, 1621; § 1011(a)(1), 117 Stat. at 2066; Bernstein, supra 
note 1. 
33 See Dianne A. Schmidley, U.S. Census Bureau, Profile of Foreign Born Popula-
tion in the United States: 2000, Current Population Reports Series P23-206, at 8 
(2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p23-206.pdf. The Census counts 
the number of “foreign-born” residents who are current U.S. residents without U.S. citizen-
ship at birth. Id. at 56--57. Thus, this term includes naturalized American citizens, legal per-
manent residents, undocumented immigrants, and people on long-term temporary visas. 
Steven A. Camarota, Immigrants at Mid-Decade: A Snapshot of America’s Foreign-
Born Population in 2005, at 29 n.2 (2005), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/ 
back1405.pdf. Thus, while the term “foreign-born” is not a completely accurate measurement 
of immigrants because of its inclusion of naturalized citizens, it nevertheless appears that 
much commentary on immigration-related issues uses the Bureau’s figure synonymously with 
the term “immigrant.” See id. at 2. 
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300%.34 Immigrants as a percentage of the overall population increased 
significantly as well, from 4.7% in 1970 to 12.1% in 2005.35 From 2000 
to 2005 alone, an additional 7.9 million immigrants entered this coun-
try.36 Since 1970, the number of naturalized citizens has decreased in 
relation to the total number of immigrants.37 As a result, the total 
number of immigrants has, since 1970, included more and more non-
naturalized residents, such as undocumented and legally residing im-
migrants.38 Of the 35.2 million estimated immigrants in 2005, a recent 
study suggests that between 9.6 and 9.8 million of these immigrants are 
undocumented.39 Undocumented immigrants comprise approximately 
one-fourth of the foreign-born population.40 Even more illustrative is 
the fact that undocumented immigrants account for approximately half 
of the recent overall growth in the immigrant population.41 
 America’s new wave of immigration differs from its historical 
roots.42 Over fifty percent of immigrants now hail from Latin America, 
with Mexican immigrants accounting for approximately thirty percent 
                                                                                                                      
34 Camarota, supra note 33, at 5 fig.2. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 4. 
37 See Schmidley, supra note 33, at 20 (finding that from 1970 to 2000 naturalized citi-
zens decreased from 63.6% to 37.4% of the foreign-born population). 
38 See id. 
39 Camarota, supra note 33, at 23. Determining the number of undocumented immi-
grants in the United States is quite difficult and has yielded several analyses that have come to 
remarkably different conclusions. See, e.g., Office of Policy & Planning, U.S. Immigration 
& Naturalization Serv., Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Re-
siding in the United States: 1990 to 2000, at 6 (2000), available at http://www.dhs. 
gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/Ill_Report_1211.pdf (estimating 7 million un-
documented immigrants for the year 2000); Neeta Fogg et al., Immigrant Workers and 
the Great American Job Machine: The Contributions of New Foreign Immigration 
to National and Regional Labor Force Growth in the 1990s 8 (2002) (estimating 
more than 12 million undocumented immigrants for the year 2000); J. Gregory Robinson, 
U.S. Census Bureau, ESCAP II: Demographic Analysis Results A-5 (2001), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p23-206.pdf (estimating 8.7 million undocumented 
immigrants for the year 2000). Despite the controversy over the most accurate estimation, 
many studies show a large increase in the number of undocumented immigrants entering 
the United States. See Camarota, supra note 33, at 4. 
40 Camarota, supra note 33, at 4. 
41 Id. One study estimated undocumented immigrant population growth at an annual 
average of 408,000 from 2000 to 2004. U.S. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec., Office of Immigra-
tion Statistics, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in 
the United States: January 2005, at 1 (2006), available at www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/as- 
sets/statistics/publications/ILL_PE_2005.pdf. 
42 See Schmidley, supra note 33, at 13 tbl.3-1 (illustrating that historically most immi-
grants hailed from Europe while most newly arriving immigrants hail from Latin America 
and Southeast Asia). 
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of the total number of immigrants.43 Not surprisingly, the areas with the 
highest ratio of immigrants to native citizens are traditional “gateway” 
areas of the United States—the southwestern border states from Cali-
fornia to Texas, New York City, and Miami.44 Moreover, undocumented 
immigration patterns mirror the settlement trends of overall immigra-
tion.45 In 2005, California, Texas, Florida, New York, Illinois, and Ari-
zona accounted for over sixty percent of the total number of unauthor-
ized immigrants.46 Geographic disparities in settlement illustrate the 
varied effects that immigration has on local communities.47 
 To understand the manner in which immigrants affect local com-
munities, one must be aware that immigrants’ lifestyles differ remarka-
bly from their native-born U.S. citizen counterparts.48 On the whole, 
immigrants’ educational and economic progress is significantly lower in 
comparison to native-born citizens.49 Immigrants are more likely than 
the native born to live in poverty, with 17.1% of immigrants in poverty 
compared to 12% of native-born citizens.50 Despite accounting for only 
12.1% of the total population, immigrants and their U.S. born children 
account for nearly one in four of those living in poverty in America.51 
As can be imagined, immigrants’ incomes are approximately twenty-five 
percent lower than natives.52 Correspondingly, immigrants are also less 
                                                                                                                      
43 U.S. Census Bureau, The Foreign-Born Population: 2000, Census 2000 Brief Se-
ries C2KBR-34, at 2 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr34. 
pdf. 
44 Id. at 6. Of the 3141 counties in the United States, only 199 counties had a percent-
age of immigrants at or above the national average. Id. 
45 See U.S. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec., supra note 41, at 1. 
46 See id. at 7 tbl.4. The estimated number and percent of total unauthorized immi-
grants per state are as follows: California 2.77 million (26%), Texas 1.36 million (13%), 
Florida 850,000 (8%), New York 560,000 (5%), Illinois 520,000 (5%), and Arizona 480,000 
(5%). Id. 
47 See id. 
48 See Schmidley, supra note 33, at 30--53 (comparing education levels, household size, 
occupation, income levels, welfare participation, and other lifestyle differences). Admit-
tedly, Schmidley’s analysis distinguishes only between the foreign-born and native-born. Id. 
at 56. However, her findings represent one of the most comprehensive analyses of the eco-
nomic and social realities facing immigrants today. See id. at 30--53. 
49 Camarota, supra note 33, at 10 tbl.6. 
50 See id. at 14 tbl.10. Because this statistic compares foreign-born immigrants to native-
born citizens, children of immigrants who were born in America fall under citizens as op-
posed to immigrants. Id. When native-born children of immigrant mothers are counted as 
immigrants, the immigrant poverty rate rises to 18.4% while the native citizen rate declines 
to 11.7%. Id. 
51 Id. at 14--15. 
52 See id. at 10. The median annual earnings of immigrants and natives are $20,800 and 
$27,600, respectively. Id. The lower median income of immigrants can be partially attrib-
uted to their lower level of education. See id. Approximately thirty percent of immigrants in 
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likely to have health insurance.53 One third of all immigrants lack 
health insurance compared to only thirteen percent of native-born citi-
zens.54 Undocumented immigrants fare even worse with an estimated 
sixty-five percent lacking health insurance.55 Given the stark educa-
tional and economic hurdles, it is not surprising that immigrants use 
public benefit programs more often than native citizens.56 However, 
despite their greater need for public benefits, recent studies have 
shown that low-income immigrants are actually less likely to have access 
to regular health care.57 
 In fact, immigrants use relatively fewer health services in compari-
son to their native-born citizen counterparts.58 A recent study by the 
Rand Corporation revealed that being an immigrant correlated to a 
“substantial and significant reduction in access” to health care com-
pared to native citizens.59 Lack of health insurance, language barriers, 
and fear of deportation are all cited as contributing factors that inhibit 
immigrants from seeking medical care.60 Researchers for the Rand 
study found that being a non-citizen adult or child resulted in dramatic 
                                                                                                                      
the labor workforce have not graduated from high school compared to only eight percent 
of natives. See id. at 9. 
53 See id. at 15 (attributing the lack of insurance to immigrants holding jobs that do not 
offer insurance and to low income levels that prevent the purchase of individual plans). 
54 See Camarota, supra note 33, at 15. 
55 Id. at 26. Undocumented immigrants, 3.3% of the total U.S. population, account for 
14% of all persons without medical insurance in the United States. Id. 
56 See id. at 16 (finding that even after the 1996 welfare reforms, immigrants are more 
likely than citizens to use welfare assistance). 
57 See, e.g., Goldman et al., supra note 25, at 1700 (finding disproportionately less use 
of medical care in comparison to representation in the U.S. population); Leighton Ku & 
Sheetal Matani, Left Out: Immigrants’ Access to Health Care and Insurance, 20 Health Aff. 
247, 249–50 (2001) (finding that immigrants were relatively less likely to visit private clinics 
or health maintenance organizations). 
58 See Goldman et al., supra note 25, at 1700. One study found that immigrants ap-
peared to be healthier than native-born adults. Id. at 1705. Only twenty-seven percent of 
undocumented immigrants reported suffering a chronic illness compared with thirty-eight 
percent of native born adults. Id. The results led one of the study’s co-authors to remark, 
“[t]his suggests that the act of immigrating to the United States favors those who are gen-
erally healthier and may discourage those who have chronic health problems.” Press Re-
lease, RAND Corp., RAND Study Shows Relatively Little Public Money Spent Providing 
Health Care to Undocumented Immigrants (Nov. 14, 2006), available at http://www.rand. 
org/news/press.06/11.14.html. 
59 Ku & Matani, supra note 57, at 251. 
60 See Marc L. Berk & Claudia L. Schur, The Effect of Fear on Access to Care Among Un-
documented Latino Immigrants, 3 J. of Immigrant Health 151, 155 (2001) (concluding that 
fear and anxiety about immigration status is a powerful deterrent to accessing medical 
care for undocumented immigrants); Ku & Matani, supra note 57, at 253--54 (finding both 
lack of health insurance and an absence of translators, which created language barriers for 
Spanish speaking immigrants, inhibited access to care). 
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reductions in a person’s actual number of doctor and emergency room 
visits compared to both native-born and naturalized citizens.61 When 
immigrants did seek medical treatment, community clinics and hospital 
outpatient departments accounted for the most frequent sources of 
care.62 
 In 2000, a subsequent study completed by Rand revealed that due 
to reduced medical care access, immigrants accounted for only a small 
fraction of total health care expenditures in the United States.63 The 
2000 study found that despite comprising approximately 13% of the 
total population, immigrants accounted for only 8.5% of total medical 
expenditures.64 Moreover, immigrants accounted for an even smaller 
percentage of total public spending on health care.65 The native-born 
accounted for 93.3% of the total public spending on health care com-
pared with 6.6% for the foreign-born.66 Focusing on undocumented 
immigrants revealed that only 1.5% of total national health care expen-
ditures went to the undocumented.67 Public supported health care for 
immigrants totaled only $1.1 billion, or 1.3% of the total $88.5 billion 
in publicly funded care.68 Studies evidencing immigrants’ lower use 
and overall expenditures of medical care suggest that policy makers 
                                                                                                                      
61 See Ku & Matani, supra note 57, at 251. The 1997 study noted that forty-one percent 
of immigrant adults and thirty-eight percent of immigrant children visited no medical 
center or emergency room. Id. at 252. In comparison, only twenty-one percent of native-
born adults and thirteen percent of native-born children reported no medical center visits. 
Id. Another independent study, based on data from 2000, revealed similar results which 
showed that the foreign-born were twice as likely as the native born to have no contact with 
the formal health care system. See Goldman et al., supra note 25, at 1705. 
62 Ku & Matani, supra note 57, at 250. The study revealed that few immigrants reported 
that the emergency room was their primary source of care. Id. 
63 See Goldman et al., supra note 25, at 1708--09. Researchers collected data by ques-
tioning over 2000 English and Spanish speaking residents of Los Angeles County, the larg-
est immigrant community in the United States, regarding their health status, health insur-
ance coverage, use of health services, and immigration status. Id. at 1701. The researchers 
then extrapolated nationwide statistics based on the results of the local findings in Los 
Angeles county. Id. at 1708 (noting that nationwide figures had the potential to overstate 
the true costs because Los Angeles is an immigrant-friendly city). 
64 Id. at 1708 exhibit 4 (estimating total health care expenditures of approximately $37 
billion on the foreign-born compared with $393 billion on the native-born). 
65 See id. (comparing expenditures for health care from public, private, and out-of-
pocket sources). 
66 See id. Out of a total of $88.5 billion in public sources, native-born patients received 
$82.6 billion in public aid compared to $5.8 billion for immigrants. Id. 
67 Id. at 1709. 
68 Goldman et al., supra note 25, at 1708 exhibit 4. 
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have been incorrect in charging that immigrants place an unduly high 
burden on taxpayers via their use of the medical system.69 
 Evaluating immigrants’ impact on the medical system at the na-
tional level does not provide a complete picture of the problems that 
PRWOA has inflicted.70 Regardless of disproportionately low use of 
medical care by immigrants, the cost of providing care to immigrants is 
felt most in particular communities.71 In an effort to improve outcomes 
and ultimately lower costs, local communities, acting through private 
funds, have expanded primary and preventive care to the uninsured, 
without regard to citizenship status.72 As a result of inadequate reim-
bursement programs and the high degree of bureaucracy involved in 
securing reimbursement, local governments and medical centers have 
absorbed much of the costs associated with providing care to immi-
grants.73 Given this reality, local medical providers, and not the federal 
government, are best poised to develop sound policies to address seri-
ous community health needs.74 
II. Undocumented Immigrants’ Right to Health Care:  
A Diminished Landscape 
 Although the goal of PRWOA was to limit immigrants’ access to 
public health care subsidies, the full impact of its new restrictions is 
only clear in the context of immigrants’ historical access to public 
benefits.75 Prior to the passage of PRWOA, federal and state laws estab-
                                                                                                                      
69 See id. at 1711 (“Health care costs are not the major component around which a pol-
icy debate about the fiscal benefits or burden of immigrants should focus.”). 
70 See Uncompensated Care in Southwest Border Counties, supra note 23, at 5 
tbl.1.2 (illustrating that if the counties along the U.S.-Mexico border were combined into a 
single state, this theoretical state would rank last in important economic measures such as 
the rate of unemployment, per capita income, children living in poverty, and residents 
without health insurance). The Border Counties Study estimated that over $190 million 
out of a total of approximately $830 million, or twenty-three percent, of uncompensated 
care was provided to undocumented immigrants in 2000. See id. at 26. 
71 See id. at 47 (noting that although federal reimbursement programs provide some 
relief, the programs fail to cover the high costs that exist in the counties along the U.S.-
Mexico border). 
72 Tanya Alteras et al., Econ. & Soc. Research Inst., Community-Based Health 
Coverage Programs: Models and Lessons 5 (2004), available at http://www.wkkf.org/ 
Pubs/Health/CommunityBasedCoverageFINAL_00250_03763.pdf. Because these types of 
plans are privately funded, the programs are financially limited and cannot serve all who 
are eligible. See id. at 4. 
73 See Uncompensated Care in Southwest Border Counties, supra note 23, at 43, 47. 
74 See Alteras et al., supra note 72, at 5. 
75 See 8 U.S.C. § 1601(4) (2000). 
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lishing immigrants’ access to health care were neither uniform nor 
consistently applied.76 In the absence of clear restrictions, health care 
professionals often provided preventive care without reference to a pa-
tient’s immigration status.77 Despite actual access to the health care sys-
tem, an immigrant’s legal access depended on his or her immigration 
status and the statutory requirements for the specific benefit.78 This 
section examines the constitutional issues in restricting public benefits 
to immigrants and additionally discusses both historical and current 
legislation aimed at restricting immigrant access to health care. 
A. Constitutional Considerations 
 Restrictions on immigrant access to public health benefits are a 
relatively recent trend.79 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, courts ruled 
in favor of immigrants contesting the denial of public benefits based on 
immigration status and alienage.80 The Supreme Court struck down 
state restrictions on federal benefit programs when those restrictions 
were based solely on immigration status.81 In the 1971 case of Graham v. 
Richardson, the Supreme Court struck down long-term residency and 
citizenship requirements for federal public health benefits on both 
equal protection and supremacy grounds.82 At issue in Richardson were 
an Arizona restriction based on long-term residency and citizenship 
and a Pennsylvania restriction based exclusively on citizenship.83 The 
Court concluded that the States’ desire to preserve public benefits for 
                                                                                                                      
76 See §§ 1611, 1621; Sharon F. Carton, The PRUCOL Proviso in Public Benefits Law: Alien 
Eligibility for Public Benefits, 14 Nova L. Rev. 1033, 1033 (1990). 
77 See Costich, supra note 16, at 1046. Additionally, it appears that health care providers 
were guided by professional ethics in their provision of services to those in need regardless 
of a patient’s legal status. Id. at 1047. 
78 See Carton, supra note 76, at 1035--36 (explaining the interplay between seven major 
legal classifications and how each particular classification applied to specific public benefit 
programs); Costich, supra note 16, at 1047. 
79 See Carton, supra note 76, at 1036 (noting that states only began restricting eligibility 
for public programs in the 1970s). 
80 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (upholding undocumented immi-
grant children’s right to public school education); Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d 845, 847, 851 
(2d Cir. 1977) (striking down a New York regulation that precluded all aliens from receiv-
ing Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits); Lewis v. Gross, 663 F. Supp. 1164, 
1177, 1183--84 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (striking down a federal regulation that included alienage 
requirements for Medicaid benefits on the grounds that the regulation went beyond the 
authority of the federal agency). 
81 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376--77 (1971); Carton, supra note 76, at 
1039. 
82 403 U.S. at 376, 380. 
83 Id. at 367--68. 
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its own citizens by providing a classification based on alienage did not 
pass constitutional muster.84 The Court also ruled that immigration 
and alienage determinations were purely federal matters and the 
States’ intrusion violated the Supremacy Clause.85 
 Any hope that Richardson provided for immigrants was short lived, 
however.86 In the 1976 case of Mathews v. Diaz, the Court upheld a fed-
eral regulation that restricted Medicare benefits to citizens and legal 
immigrants residing in the United States for at least five years.87 The 
Court, while acknowledging that all persons were protected by the Due 
Process Clause, rejected arguments that all aliens were entitled to the 
full benefits and advantages of citizenship and denied claims that all 
aliens were entitled to the same legal classification.88 In reaching its de-
cision, the Court explicitly referenced and distinguished the Richardson 
case.89 Because it was Congress, and not a state, conditioning immi-
grants’ access to Medicare, no federalism issues were involved.90 Fur-
thermore, Congress’s federal power over immigration meant that the 
equal protection analysis in Richardson did not apply in Diaz.91 Rather, 
the Court ruled that decisions made by Congress in the area of immi-
gration, an area of plenary power, dictate a narrow standard of review.92 
Ultimately, Richardson and Diaz led to the understanding that state re-
strictions, subject to strict scrutiny, would in most cases be struck down, 
while federal restrictions, dictated by a narrow standard of review, 
would likely be upheld.93 
B. PRUCOL: A Period of Flexible Access 
 Prior to major welfare reform in 1996, the legal landscape by 
which immigrants received public benefits was fragmented according 
to the type of benefit desired.94 This fragmentation resulted not from 
any state or federal distinction, but rather from the varying require-
ments of the different programs as well as non-uniform judicial inter-
                                                                                                                      
84 Id. at 374. 
85 Id. at 378. 
86 See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84 (1976). 
87 Id. at 69. 
88 Id. at 78. 
89 Id. at 84--85. 
90 See id. 
91 See Diaz, 426 U.S. at 86--87. 
92 Id. at 81--82. 
93 See id.; Richardson, 403 U.S. at 376--77; Carton, supra note 76, at 1039. 
94 See Carton, supra note 76, at 1033 (noting that access to particular benefits had been 
the subject of extensive legislation and litigation). 
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pretation of whether an immigrant was “permanently residing under 
color of law” (PRUCOL).95 It is important to note that PRUCOL is a 
legislatively-enacted category for public benefits eligibility, not a specific 
immigration status.96 
 The PRUCOL provision originated in a 1972 amendment to the 
Social Security Act that restricted immigrant access to the Supplemen-
tal Security Insurance program.97 The amendment conditioned eligibil-
ity on whether the applicant was “either (i) a citizen or (ii) an alien law-
fully admitted for permanent residence or otherwise permanently 
residing in the United States under color of law.”98 PRUCOL gradually 
was incorporated as a requirement into other major public benefit pro-
grams, including Aid to Families with Dependant Children (AFDC), 
unemployment insurance, and Medicaid.99 Despite wide incorporation 
of the provision, Congress’s failure to provide an initial statutory defini-
tion or leave any legislative history as to the proper meaning of PRU-
COL was problematic.100 As a result of this ambiguity, a broad category 
of undocumented immigrants were eligible for benefits despite their 
uncertain legal status.101 The lack of a definitive understanding as to 
what PRUCOL actually entailed led to extensive litigation and differing 
judicial interpretations.102 During the PRUCOL era, many courts pro-
tected undocumented immigrants from being denied public bene-
fits.103 
 While PRUCOL first appeared in federal regulations and statutes, 
it was the judiciary that gave the term its operative meaning.104 In Holley 
v. Lavine, the first case to address the meaning of PRUCOL, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit liberally interpreted PRUCOL 
                                                                                                                      
95 See id. 
96 Id. at 1035. 
97 See Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 1614, 86 Stat. 1329, 1471 (1972) (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(1)(B) (2000)); Carton, supra note 76, at 1039. 
98 § 1614, 86 Stat. at 1471. 
99 See Carton, supra note 76, at 1039. 
100 See id. at 1033, 1042. Congress finally provided a definition of PRUCOL in 1986. See 
infra notes 111--115 and accompanying text. 
101 See Costich, supra note 16, at 1046. 
102 See Carton, supra note 76, at 1033, 1049. 
103 See, e.g., Holley, 553 F.2d at 847, 851 (upholding an undocumented immigrant’s ac-
cess to AFDC benefits); Lewis, 663 F. Supp. at 1177, 1183--84 (rejecting a federal agency’s 
imposition of a more stringent alienage requirement than Congress originally imposed in 
determining Medicaid eligibility). 
104 See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(1)(B) (2000); Holley, 553 F.2d at 849--50. The court’s 
analysis of the federal regulation that governed the AFDC program presents an informa-
tive example of the language typically found in federal and state statutes and regulations 
and how that language came to be interpreted by the courts. See Holley, 553 F.2d at 849--50. 
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and ultimately granted AFDC benefits to the plaintiff Gayle Holley de-
spite her undocumented status.105 At issue was whether Holley could 
properly be designated as either “(a) a citizen or (b) an alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence or otherwise permanently residing in 
the United States under color of law.”106 In embracing an expansive reading 
of the phrase “under color of law,” the Court ruled that the regulation 
deliberately sanctioned the inclusion of cases that were “in strict terms, 
outside the law but . . . near the border.”107 Specifically, the Court 
found that Holley should be designated as PRUCOL because the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service (INS) had issued a letter of intent 
stating that it knew of her residency and did not intend to deport her 
and because her residency was “continuing or lasting” as opposed to 
“temporary.”108 Thus, an immigrant whose status was unclear or am-
biguous, like the plaintiff in Holley, could be eligible for public bene-
fits.109 Although the majority of undocumented immigrants’ lack of le-
gal status was clear, a significant number of immigrants were 
nevertheless able to access public benefit programs because of their 
unclear legal status.110 While most courts followed Holley’s broad read-
ing, others interpreted PRUCOL more narrowly to confer access only 
to citizens and legal permanently residing immigrants.111 
 It was not until 1986, when Congress first provided a definition of 
PRUCOL, that the phrase began to gain a consistent meaning.112 Con-
gress’s definition came in response to a judicial ruling that rejected a 
federal agency regulation, in the absence of explicit statutory support, 
limiting Medicaid eligibility to citizens, legal permanent residents, and 
PRUCOLs.113 Section 9406 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
                                                                                                                      
105 See Holley, 553 F.2d at 851; Carton, supra note 76, at 1042--43. 
106 Holley, 553 F.2d at 848--49 (emphasis added). Holley had entered the United States 
lawfully on a student visa, married a citizen, and subsequently had six children who were 
American citizens. Id. at 847--48. However, at the time of the suit, Holley had separated 
from her husband, and thus, was determined to be unlawfully residing in the country. Id. 
at 848--49. 
107 See id. at 849--50. 
108 Id. at 847, 850. 
109 See id.; Costich, supra note 16, at 1046. 
110 See Costich, supra note 16, at 1046. 
111 See, e.g., Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456, 1459, 1462--63 (9th Cir. 1985) (deny-
ing asylum seekers eligibility for AFCD benefits because while they reside under color of 
law, their residence is not deemed to be permanent); Esparza v. Valdez, 612 F. Supp. 241, 
244 (D. Colo. 1985) (restricting unemployment compensation benefits to immigrants 
whose lawful status allows residency in the United States for an indefinite period of time). 
112 See Carton, supra note 76, at 1041. 
113 See Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9406, 100 Stat. 1874, 2057 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1396(b)(v) (2000)). In Lewis v. Gross, the court ruled that Congress’ failure to 
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of 1986 (OBRA-86) restored the federal agency’s interpretation and 
stated that PRUCOL should encompass “all of the categories recog-
nized by immigration law, policy, and practice.”114 Additionally, Con-
gress urged the federal agency and the states to broadly interpret the 
phrase “under color of law.”115 Thus, it appears that Congress em-
braced the expansive interpretation of eligibility as first understood in 
Holley.116 
  Even with Congress’s definition of PRUCOL and legislative his-
tory to aid in interpretation, PRUCOL has never enjoyed universal ap-
plication to the various public benefit programs.117 Generally, courts in 
some jurisdictions continued to interpret PRUCOL liberally, just as the 
first court to interpret PRUCOL had done in Holley.118 One commenta-
tor has remarked that eligibility for public benefits during this time was 
“a legal morass marked by wide inconsistency and topical contro-
versy.”119 Nevertheless, compared to later restrictions, the PRUCOL pro-
vision was generally sympathetic to undocumented immigrants seeking 
public benefits.120 The passage of PRWOA in 1996 brought an end to 
PRUCOL’s expansive eligibility and ushered in an anti-immigrant era 
that has seen the elimination of public benefit eligibility for many im-
migrants.121 
C. PRWOA: A Drastic Step Backwards 
 On August 22, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, drasti-
                                                                                                                      
include an alienage restriction in the federal Medicaid statute prevented the Department 
of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), a federal agency, from imposing more restric-
tive eligibility requirements. See 663 F. Supp. at 1182--84. The court stated that Congress 
knew how to impose alienage restrictions and in the absence of such restrictions, Con-
gress’ refusal should be respected. Id. at 1183. 
114 See H.R. Rep. No. 99-727, at 111 (1986); Carton, supra note 76, at 1041. In enacting 
OBRA-86, Congress validated HEW’s understanding of Medicaid eligibility by codifying the 
same interpretation that was stuck down in Lewis. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1396(b)(v) with 
Lewis, 663 F. Supp. at 1182--84. 
115 H.R. Rep. No. 99-727, at 111; Carton, supra note 76, at 1042. 
116 See Holley, 553 F.2d at 849--50. 
117 See Carton, supra note 76, at 1050. 
118 See 553 F.2d at 848--49; Carton, supra note 76, at 1049–50. 
119 See Carton, supra note 76, at 1033. 
120 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1611, 1621 (2000); Holley, 553 F.2d at 851; Lewis, 663 F. Supp. at 
1183. 
121 See §§ 1601--1646; see also Costich, supra note 16, at 1053 (noting that PRWOA abol-
ished the PRUCOL doctrine). 
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cally changing immigrant access to public health care and benefits.122 
PRWOA fundamentally altered the way eligibility for public benefits is 
determined by shifting authority away from the federal government 
and to the states.123 Under the Act, states have great flexibility in de-
termining which immigrants are eligible for state and locally funded 
benefits.124 For the first time, citizen status requirements for the major 
federal and state public benefit programs became standardized.125 The 
legislation’s greatest impact on both documented and undocumented 
immigrants is its broad repudiation of public benefits.126 
 In determining public benefit eligibility PRWOA distinguishes be-
tween “qualified aliens” and non-qualified aliens.127 Under the original 
PRWOA legislation, qualified aliens included legally permanent resi-
dents, asylum seekers, refugees, aliens paroled into the United States 
for a period of at least one year, aliens whose deportation is being with-
held by INS, and aliens granted conditional entry.128 A subsequent 
amendment, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, added certain Cuban 
and Haitian entrants and aliens subjected to domestic violence who are 
in the process of obtaining status as qualified aliens.129 All other immi-
grants, including the undocumented, are not classified as qualified 
aliens.130 
                                                                                                                      
122 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-193, §§ 401, 411, 431, 110 Stat. 2105, 2261–62, 2268–69, 2274 (1996) (current 
version at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1611, 1641 (2000)); Elizabeth Hull, The Unkindest Cuts: The 
1996 Welfare Reform Act’s Impact on Resident Aliens, 33 Gonz. L. Rev. 471, 485 (1997 & 1998). 
Interestingly, President Clinton appears to have been rather sympathetic to immigrants by 
stating that he intended to undo many of the immigrant-targeted restrictions. See Wendy 
Zimmermann & Karen C. Tumlin, Urban Inst., Patchwork Policies: State Assistance 
for Immigrants Under Welfare Reform 8 (1999). 
123 See Zimmermann & Tumlin, supra note 122, at 1–2 (noting that prior to the passage 
of PRWOA the federal government enjoyed plenary power for determining immigrant 
eligibility for benefits while the states could not determine eligibility by alienage). 
124 See id. at 9. In addition to determining eligibility for already existing state programs, 
states were given the choice of whether to create new programs to fill the gap created by 
the loss of all federal assistance for non-qualified immigrants. Id. 
125 See §§ 401, 411, 431, 110 Stat. 2261–62, 2268–69, 2274 (defining all federally funded 
assistance together as “Federal Public Benefit” and all state or locally funded assistance as 
“State or Local Public Benefit”). 
126 See §§ 401, 402, 411, 412, 110 Stat. at 2261–65, 2268–70. 
127 § 431, 110 Stat. at 2274. 
128 See Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 431(b), 110 Stat. 2105, 2274 (1996). 
129 See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, §§ 5302, 5571, 111 Stat. 251, 
598–600, 640–41 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b)–(c) (2000)). 
130 See § 1641(a). In nearly every situation an undocumented immigrant would likely 
fail to meet the requirements of a qualified alien. See id. 
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 Because in most circumstances undocumented immigrants cannot 
be deemed qualified immigrants, they fare poorly under PRWOA.131 
PRWOA denies undocumented immigrants access to all non-
emergency health care benefits.132 With few exceptions, undocu-
mented immigrants are foreclosed from receiving federal public bene-
fits, including Medicare and Medicaid.133 Moreover, PRWOA restricts 
the states’ ability to provide any state or local public benefits.134 A state 
can provide non-emergency health care only by enacting a state law 
that affirmatively makes unqualified immigrants eligible.135 In theory 
then, in order for a local health care provider to administer preventive 
health care, it must wait for the state legislature to pass affirmative legis-
lation countering PRWOA’s anti-immigrant provisions.136 
 Qualified immigrant access to public benefits is similarly curtailed 
under PRWOA.137 Prior to 1996, most PRWOA-qualified immigrants fell 
under the PRUCOL classification and were eligible for most public 
benefits, including Medicaid.138 However, under PRWOA, qualified im-
migrants’ access to public benefits is dependent upon additional fac-
                                                                                                                      
131 See. §§ 1611, 1621. 
132 See id. 
133 See § 1611(c)(1)(B) (including in “[f]ederal public benefit” any “retirement, wel-
fare, health, disability, public or assisted housing, postsecondary education, food assis-
tance, unemployment benefit or any other similar benefit” funded by the federal govern-
ment); Costich, supra note 16, at 1052. 
134 See § 1621(c)(1)(B) (including in “state or local benefit” the same classification of 
benefits as defined at the federal level, but funded through the state or local community). 
135 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) (2000); see Doe v. Wilson, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 187, 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1997) (upholding PRWOA’s ability to require pre-existing state benefit programs to be ter-
minated in absence of affirmative, post-PRWOA legislation). In Doe v. Wilson, the Governor of 
California and Director of the California Department of Health Services sought to imple-
ment an interim emergency regulation that would prohibit doctors from providing publicly 
funded prenatal care to undocumented immigrants. Id. The emergency regulation would 
bring California hospitals into compliance with PRWOA by prohibiting previously allowed 
prenatal care until a new law had been passed authorizing such care. Id. The Court of Ap-
peals for the First District vacated, and ultimately denied, an injunction to prevent imple-
mentation of the emergency regulation granted by the district court. Id. at 199. 
136 See § 1621(d). One commentator has argued that based on federalism principles, 
the constitutionality of PRWOA as it applies to the states is unsound. See Alison Fee, Note, 
Forbidding States from Providing Essential Social Services to Illegal Immigrants: The Constitutional-
ity of Recent Federal Action, 7 B.U. Pub. Int. L. J. 93, 99 (1998). 
137 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1612, 1622 . One exception is that PRWOA contains a grandfather 
clause that maintains assistance for most immigrants who were receiving benefits prior to 
its passage. See § 1612(a)(2)(D)(i)(III), (ii)(III). 
138 See §§ 1601--1646; Carton, supra note 76, at 1034--35 (stating that lawful permanent 
residents, refugees, asylees, and conditional entrants were generally eligible for public 
benefits). 
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tors.139 Immigrants who are refugees and asylum seekers are entitled to 
most public benefits for a minimum of seven years from the date of 
their arrival into the United States.140 For non-refugee or -asylum immi-
grants, eligibility for certain programs is dependent on the applicant’s 
date of immigration.141 Immigrants entering the country after the date 
of enactment, even if properly documented, are prohibited from receiv-
ing federal public benefits for their first five years of residency.142 After 
this five-year residency period, qualified immigrants become eligible for 
public benefits.143 PRWOA is generally more lenient to immigrants who 
entered the country prior to the date of its enactment.144 
 Despite a number of restrictions, PRWOA provides limited excep-
tions under which undocumented immigrants and qualified immi-
grants barred from eligibility due to the five-year residency requirement 
may retain access to health care.145 Specifically, these immigrants con-
tinue to have access to emergency medical care, disaster relief, immu-
nizations and treatment for communicable diseases, and certain pro-
grams designated by the U.S. Attorney General as necessary for the 
protection of life or safety, such as soup kitchens and short-term shel-
ter.146 However, health care providers complain that PRWOA effectively 
bars non-qualified immigrants from receiving any social services or pre-
ventive health care.147 
                                                                                                                      
139 See Zimmermann & Tumlin, supra note 122, at 15--16 (explaining that eligibility 
turns on the type of immigrant and the date of immigration). 
140 § 1612(a)(2). 
141 See 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(D)--(F) (2000). 
142 See § 1613(a). Post-enactment immigrants are generally prohibited from enrolling 
in Supplemental Security Income, food stamp, non-emergency Medicaid, and state child 
health insurance programs. Zimmermann & Tumlin, supra note 122, at 14. Qualified im-
migrants are thus treated the same as unqualified immigrants during the initial five year 
period of residency. See § 1613(a). 
143 See §§ 1612, 1613(a). 
144 See § 1612(a)(2)(D)--(F); Zimmermann & Tumlin, supra note 122, at 16. However, 
this leniency did not start until amendments to the original legislation were made in 1997. 
See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 5301, 111 Stat. 251, 597--98 (1997) 
(current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1612(a)(2)(E)--(F) (2000)). Under the original legislation, 
pre-enactment immigrants could be deemed ineligible for some benefit programs if they 
failed to meet the new qualified alien requirements. See Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 402(a), 110 Stat. 2105, 
2262--65 (1996) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1612 (2000)). 
145 See § 1611(b). 
146 Id. 
147 See, e.g., Steve Brewer, Opinion Supports Immigrant Care: County Attorney Says Federal 
Law Would Not Be Violated as a Result, Houston Chron., Sept. 7, 2001 at A29 (discussing 
cloud of criminal liability that may result from providing treatment to undocumented 
immigrants). 
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 States are free to enact legislation that uses state and local re-
sources to provide public benefits to unqualified and undocumented 
immigrants.148 Both California and Texas, two states with high immi-
grant populations, recently enacted laws affirming the ability of public 
hospitals to provide medical care to immigrants who would otherwise 
be foreclosed from receiving care under PRWOA.149 Neither state law 
mandates that local hospitals provide health care to undocumented 
immigrants.150 Instead, like the devolution of determining eligibility 
from the federal to the state level under PRWOA, these affirmative 
state laws defer responsibility over eligibility to the local level.151 The 
impact of the California and Texas laws is still unknown, especially in 
light of the fact that several hospitals in both California and Texas con-
tinued to provide non-emergency care prior to the enactment of af-
firmative state laws.152 
 Given PRWOA’s clear mandate, it is surprising that Congress ne-
glected to include any enforcement mechanism against local health 
care providers who violate the law.153 Discussion and interpretation of 
enforcement has received little attention.154 The only known discussion 
of possible consequences for violation of PRWOA resulted from a letter 
of inquiry from a county hospital to the Texas Attorney General.155 In 
                                                                                                                      
148 See 8 U.S.C. § 1622(d) (2000). 
149 See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 17850--17851 (West. Supp. 2007); Tex. Health & 
Safety Code Ann. § 285.201 (Vernon Supp. 2006); Camarota, supra note 33, at 6 tbl.1. In 
2006, California enacted a law that “affirm[s] the ability of counties, cities, and hospital 
districts to provide health care and other services to all residents, if any of these entities 
has decided to do so at its own discretion.” See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 17850--17851. 
In 2003, the Texas state legislature affirmatively authorized local hospitals to provide pre-
ventive, non-emergency medical care to resident immigrants regardless of citizenship 
status, provided the services are locally funded. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 
§ 285.201. 
150 See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 17850--17851; Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 
§ 285.201; Immigrant Benefits Updates, The Policy Page (Center for Pub. Pol’y Priorities, 
Austin, Tex.), Aug. 12, 2003, at 5, available at http://www.cppp.org/files/3/PP202.pdf 
(noting that districts in Texas may continue to choose to limit care). 
151 See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 17850--17851; Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 
§ 285.201; Zimmermann & Tumlin, supra note 122, at 1. 
152 See Ed Fletcher, Health Costs Scrutinized: Debate Resumes on County Care for Illegal Immi-
grants, Sacramento Bee, Jan. 1, 2007, at B1 (reporting that county hospitals in Sacramento, 
California routinely provided care without ascertaining the patient’s legal status in possible 
violation of federal law); Yardley, supra note 26 (noting that hospitals in Houston, Dallas, San 
Antonio, and El Paso provide non-emergency care to undocumented immigrants). 
153 See Op. Tex. Att’y Gen. No. JC-0394, at 1 (2001), available at http://www.oag.state. 
tx.us/opinions/jc/JC0394.pdf. 
154 See Fletcher, supra note 152. 
155 See Op. Tex. Att’y Gen. No. JC-0394, supra note 153, at 1. 
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providing his Opinion, the Texas Attorney General acknowledged that 
PRWOA itself provided no enforcement procedure or penalties.156 
However, that did not eliminate the potential for both federal and state 
sanctions.157 Since, at the time of the Attorney General’s Opinion, 
Texas had not passed an affirmative state law after PRWOA, providing 
non-emergency care could have constituted a violation of both federal 
and state law.158 Because the county hospital received federal and state 
funds, conditioned on compliance with each, the hospital risked losing 
all of its public funding.159 While the Attorney General’s Opinion was 
and is not binding, it nevertheless is a persuasive authority.160 As a re-
sult, many hospitals in Texas have chosen to cut non-emergency health 
care to immigrants rather than be subject to funding cuts or potential 
criminal sanctions.161 
D. EMTALA’s Emergency Care Mandate 
 It is ironic that on one hand federal law denies both non-qualified 
and undocumented immigrants access to most public benefits, yet on 
the other hand explicitly affirms these immigrants’ right to emergency 
medical care.162 Understanding this apparent dichotomy requires an 
analysis of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act 
(EMTALA), a separate, pre-existing piece of federal legislation.163 EM-
TALA was enacted in 1986 to prevent “patient dumping,” or the refusal 
to provide necessary emergency treatment because the person seeking 
care was poor, indigent, or uninsured.164 EMTALA imposes two primary 
                                                                                                                      
156 Id. at 6. 
157 See id. 
158 See id. at 4, 6. 
159 See id. at 6--7. 
160 See Kerby v. Collin County, 212 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948). 
161 See Harvey Rice, Cuts in Immigrant Care Questioned: Hospital Trustees Want AG to Recon-
sider Rules, Houston Chron., Aug. 23, 2001, at A17 (recognizing that county hospitals 
were fearful of criminal prosecution for providing care that violated PRWOA). 
162 See 8 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1)(A) (2000) (excluding non-eligibility “for care and ser-
vices that are necessary for the treatment of an emergency medical condition” that is not 
related to an organ transplant procedure). 
163 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2000). Theoretically, any hospital operating an emer-
gency room may freely dispense of the obligations imposed under EMTALA simply by 
rejecting federal funding. See § 1395dd(e)(2) (defining “participating hospital”); Russell 
Korobakin, Is America’s Health Care System in Mortal Peril? Determining Health Care Rights from 
Behind a Veil of Ignorance, 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 801, 829. In reality, most medical centers with 
emergency rooms depend heavily on federal funding and therefore are not in an eco-
nomic position to reject federal receipts. See Korobakin, supra, at 829. 
164 See 131 Cong. Rec. 28569 (1985) (statement of Sen. Dole) (stating that hospitals 
must provide an “adequate first response to a medical crisis”). EMTALA “send[s] a clear 
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obligations on hospital emergency rooms.165 First, the emergency room 
must provide an appropriate screening to any individual who presents 
himself or herself at the emergency room.166 Secondly, if the emer-
gency department determines that an emergency medical condition 
exists, the hospital must stabilize the patient or provide for an adequate 
transfer.167 
 EMTALA requires that health care providers follow the same pro-
cedures in all potential emergency cases; thus, immigration status must 
not be an impediment to accessing care.168 Immigrants who are neither 
qualified under PRWOA nor documented can secure a minimum level 
of care by showing up at a hospital with an emergency department.169 
Viewed in this manner, EMTALA provides immigrants with a much 
needed safety net of medical care.170 In addition to admirably provid-
ing emergency care to everyone, EMTALA also has magnified the ef-
fects of some pre-existing problems within the U.S. health care system, 
such as the rising rate of uninsurance.171 In enacting EMTALA, Con-
gress did not provide any method of compensation or direct any funds 
to hospitals for the losses incurred in providing emergency care to un-
documented immigrants and the indigent.172 Hospitals treating large 
uninsured and undocumented immigrant populations have borne the 
financial burden of providing this mandated level of care.173 Because 
EMTALA, at a minimum, mandates that hospitals provide emergency 
care that can often be more costly and less effective than preventive 
care, PRWOA’s prohibition on cost-effective preventive care is eco-
nomically irrational.174 
                                                                                                                      
signal to the hospital community . . . that all Americans, regardless of wealth or status, 
should know that a hospital will provide what services it can when they are truly in physical 
distress.” Id. at 28568 (statement of Sen. Durenberger). 
165 See § 1395dd(a)--(b). 
166 § 1395dd(a). Extensive litigation has addressed what constitutes an adequate 
screening. See, e.g., Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 878 (4th Cir. 1992) (ruling 
that a hospital provides an appropriate screening when it applies its normal screening 
procedure uniformly to all similarly situated patients). 
167 See § 1395dd(b). 
168 See Costich, supra note 16, at 1051. 
169 See Laura D. Hermer, The Scapegoat: EMTALA and Emergency Department Overcrowding, 
14 J. L. & Pol’y 695, 695 (2006). 
170 See id. at 725. 
171 See id. at 709. 
172 Id. at 723. 
173 See Uncompensated Care in Southwest Border Counties, supra note 23, at iii; 
Hermer, supra note 169, at 715. 
174 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601--1646 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2000); Care For Immi-
grants, supra note 21, at 1. 
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III. Congressional Intent and Subsequent Funding Legislation: 
An Evaluation of PRWOA 
 In enacting PRWOA, the Republican-led 104th Congress, riding a 
wave of popular support to curtail federal spending under the “Con-
tract with America,” slashed federal expenditures without regard to the 
consequences.175 Responding to anecdotal evidence of mass immigra-
tion motivated by the desire to access the U.S. health care system, 
PRWOA curtailed immigrants’ access to health care in an unprece-
dented manner.176 PRWOA enjoyed easy passage with over seventy-five 
percent of lawmakers supporting it in both the House of Representa-
tives and the Senate.177 However, despite significant support, several 
lawmakers correctly anticipated the dire economic consequences of 
denying immigrants access to most forms of preventive health care.178 
Furthermore, Congress allocated as little funding as possible to cover 
the expenses associated with providing minimal, but mandated, levels 
of care.179 
A. Congressional Intent 
 As evidenced in its introductory text, Congress’s intent in enacting 
PRWOA’s anti-immigrant provisions was multi-fold.180 First, Congress 
saw self-sufficiency as the basic principle of U.S. immigration law.181 
Congress maintained that immigrants should “not depend on public 
resources to meet their needs” and that “public benefits must not con-
stitute an incentive for immigration.”182 Second, Congress believed that 
the then-existing eligibility requirements for public benefits “proved 
wholly incapable of assuring that individual aliens not burden the pub-
lic benefits system.”183 Additionally, it appears that Congress was re-
sponding, in part, to complaints from states that the rising costs of pro-
                                                                                                                      
175 See Costich, supra note 16, at 1043--44. 
176 See id. 
177 See 142 Cong. Rec. 20731, 20991 (1996). The bill passed 78-21, with one absten-
tion, in the Senate and 328-101, with five abstentions, in the House of Representatives. Id. 
178 Costich, supra note 16, at 1043. 
179 See, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. 17608 (1996) (statement of Rep. Richardson) (arguing 
that PRWOA “unfairly shifts costs to States with high numbers of . . . immigrants”); 
Costich, supra note 16, at 1043. 
180 8 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000). 
181 § 1601(1) (stating that the self-sufficiency principle extends back to the earliest 
immigration statues). 
182 § 1601(2)(A)--(B) 
183 § 1601(4). 
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viding medical care to immigrants were hindering their ability to pro-
vide adequate services for the rest of their citizens.184 
 A review of the legislative history suggests that Congress was moti-
vated, in part, by the expected federal expenditure savings and elimina-
tion of the “fraud and abuse” of public resources by immigrants.185 
Congress employed studies that estimated the annual receipt of public 
benefits by immigrants at approximately $26 billion.186 It was believed 
that restricting immigrant access to welfare and other public benefits 
would save the federal government approximately $24 billion over the 
first six years of PRWOA’s implementation.187 Specifically, by restricting 
immigrant eligibility to Medicaid, Congress anticipated saving a mere 
$1 million in 1997 with the savings rising to $1.5 billion annually by 
2002.188 Congress intended PRWOA to be a fiscally responsible meas-
ure aimed at reducing the federal deficit.189 Congressional debates also 
illustrated intent to foreclose immigrants from fraudulently gaining 
eligibility to public benefits.190 Senator Lamar Smith of Texas remarked 
that PRWOA took “a number of steps toward ending the abuse of the 
welfare system by those legal immigrants who come to America not to 
go to work, but to go on welfare.”191 Congress appeared to be con-
                                                                                                                      
184 See 142 Cong. Rec. 17615 (1996) (statement of Rep. Smith) (noting that American 
taxpayers are growing increasingly tired of paying for benefits to immigrants); Costich, 
supra note 16, at 1044. 
185 See 142 Cong. Rec. 17615 (1996) (statement of Rep. Smith); 141 Cong. Rec. 25596 
(1995) (statement of Sen. Cohen). 
186 See 142 Cong. Rec. 17615 (1996) (statement of Rep. Smith). 
187 See Cong. Budget Office, CBO Memorandum: Federal Budgetary Implica-
tions of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, at 27 tbl.4 
(1996). Overall, PRWOA was expected to yield approximately $55 billion in savings over 
the first six years. Recent Legislation, Welfare Reform, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1191, 1191--92 
(1997). 
188 Cong. Budget Office, supra note 187, at 31. 
189 See 142 Cong. Rec. 20721 (1996) (statement of Rep. Bentsen) (stating that PRWOA 
“contains many misguided provisions for which the only motivation is monetary, not public 
policy”); 141 Cong. Rec. 25589 (1995) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (stating in opposition 
that PRWOA was truly about “misguided priorities” and “cutting off assistance to millions 
of poor, hungry, homeless, and disabled children”). 
190 See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. 25597 (1995) (statement of Sen. Smith). 
191 Id. The issue of whether access to public benefits drives illegal immigration was fre-
quently debated during the 1990s. See Costich, supra note 16, at 1044. Studies reveal that 
government subsidies are not a compelling draw for most undocumented immigrants to 
seek entry into the United States. See Marc L. Berk et al., Health Care Use Among Undocu-
mented Latino Immigrants, 19 Health Aff. 51, 56 exhibit 2 (2000) (finding social services as 
a motivating factor for less than one percent of Latino immigration); Liang & Ye, supra 
note 2, at 199--200 (finding that economic motivations attract many Fujianese Chinese 
undocumented immigrants). 
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cerned with the systematic waste, fraud, and abuse that existed 
throughout the overall welfare system.192 
 The legislative history additionally illustrates the existence of a 
spirited opposition to PRWOA.193 Opponents of the measure appeared 
to be most strongly moved by PRWOA’s unfair targeting of legal immi-
grants.194 Specifically, many lawmakers were troubled by the retroactive 
change in public benefits eligibility for legal immigrants who were on 
the path to citizenship.195 Another significant concern for lawmakers 
was that PRWOA effectively shifted costs away from the federal gov-
ernment onto the states.196 Senator Tom Daschle of South Dakota re-
marked that PRWOA “shift[s] the welfare problem to the states” and 
“tell[s] local taxpayers that they have to pick up the tab.”197 In a letter 
addressed to members of Congress, the National Association of Coun-
ties urged lawmakers to vote against PRWOA because of its potential to 
“shift costs and liabilities” and “create new unfunded mandates upon 
local governments.”198 Specifically, opponents asserted that this cost-
shifting change in Medicaid would negatively impact local healthcare 
providers and the public’s overall health.199 The record indicates that 
hospitals feared the restriction on Medicaid would result in a loss of 
funds and a corresponding reduction in services available to everyone, 
citizens and non-citizens alike.200 However, the funding crisis would es-
pecially affect those hospitals serving communities with large numbers 
of immigrants.201 To fully understand the concept of cost-shifting, a 
                                                                                                                      
192 See 141 Cong. Rec. 9201 (1995) (statement of Rep. Walker). 
193 See, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. 17604 (1996) (statement of Rep. Pastor). 
194 See id. Representative Ed Pastor (D.-Ariz.) believed that a misconception exists, both 
in the country at-large and in the House, that legal immigrants are here for one purpose 
only: to take advantage of welfare. Id. Pastor stated that in reality, most legal immigrants 
had been in this country for many years and have worked hard while here. Id. 
195 See, e.g., id. at 20721 (statement of Rep. Bentsen) (noting that despite supporting 
the measure, he was troubled with the elimination of benefits). 
196 141 Cong. Rec. 25615–16 (1995) (statement of Sen. Daschle). 
197 Id. (stating that a contingency fund would help alleviate shifts in costs). 
198 See 142 Cong. Rec. 18291 (1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
199 See id. at 18295 (statement of Sen. Kennedy). In discussion of an amendment to delay 
implementation of the new Medicaid eligibility requirements, Senator Kennedy (D.-Mass.) 
noted that several of the nation’s hospital groups urged a transition. See id. (relaying the opin-
ions, among others, of the American Hospital Association, National Association of Children’s 
Hospitals, National Association of Community Health Centers, and National Association of 
Public Hospitals). 
200 Id. 
201 Id. For example, Cambridge City Hospital in Massachusetts counted forty-eight per-
cent of its patients as immigrants and thus, risked losing up to half of its Medicaid funding 
under PRWOA. Id. 
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brief examination of reimbursement mechanisms available to Medicaid 
hospitals is in order. 
B. Federal Reimbursement Schemes 
 Hospitals providing emergency care to immigrants may qualify for 
reimbursement under Emergency Medicaid, the Disproportionate 
Share Hospital Program, or Section 1011 of the Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003.202 None of these 
current federal programs provide full reimbursement to cover the en-
tire cost associated with treating non-qualified PRWOA and undocu-
mented immigrants.203 Bureaucratic red tape, restrictions on classifying 
treatment as emergency care, and other issues reduce the incentive for 
hospital participation.204 
 Emergency Medicaid is a joint federal-state program that provides 
federal matching funds directly to hospitals that provide emergency 
care to eligible patients.205 Reimbursable services include only those 
services provided in response to “emergency medical conditions” that 
lead to acute symptoms that could place the patient’s life in jeopardy, 
seriously impair bodily functions, or cause serious dysfunction of a bod-
ily organ.206 In order to qualify for reimbursement, the care must be for 
                                                                                                                      
202 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396b(v), 1396r-4 (2000); Medicare Prescription Drug, Improve-
ment, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1011(a)(1), 117 Stat. 2066, 
2432 (to be codified in scattered sections of 26, 42 U.S.C.). From 1998 to 2001 Congress 
implemented a reimbursement scheme that appropriated $25 million per fiscal year to the 
twelve states with the highest undocumented immigrant populations. See Balanced Budget 
Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4723, 111 Stat. 251, 515--16 (1997). However, unlike 
Emergency Medicaid, § 4723 funds were available only to reimburse emergency costs pro-
vided to undocumented immigrants who did not meet Medicaid eligibility. See Alison M. 
Siskin, Cong. Research Serv., Federal Funding for Unauthorized Aliens’ Emer-
gency Medical Expenses 3 (Oct. 18, 2004), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/ 
govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-8206:1. Section 4723 funds were distributed according to 
each state’s share of the total estimated number of undocumented immigrants living in 
the twelve states. Id. Eighty-nine percent of the total funds went to the five states with the 
highest concentration of immigrants, which were California, Texas, New York, Florida, and 
Illinois. Id. at 4. 
203 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (current version at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601--1646 (2000)); 
Uncompensated Care in Southwest Border Counties, supra note 23, at 12. 
204 See Stephen Franklin & Bruce Japsen, No Rush to Claim Cash for ER Bills: Hospitals 
Cite Ethics, Red Tape as Obstacles, Chi. Trib., Sept. 17, 2006, at C1 (noting that only fifteen 
percent of the funds available under § 4723 of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 were 
handed out after nine months of the program). 
205 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v). 
206 See § 1396b(v)(3). While Emergency Medicaid describes “emergency medical con-
dition” in substantially the same manner as is found in EMTALA, it appears as though 
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an immigrant who meets all the state specific eligibility requirements, 
except citizenship status, as defined by that state’s Medicaid pro-
gram.207 Accordingly, in order to make a claim to the federal agency 
administering the program, a hospital must ascertain whether the pa-
tient would be eligible for Medicare in absence of any citizenship re-
quirement.208 States with less restrictive state Medicaid eligibility criteria 
are able to make claims for a more expansive group of patients.209 The 
rate of federal reimbursement varies according to each particular 
state’s relative wealth index, with no hospital receiving less than fifty 
percent and no hospital receiving more than eighty-five percent of 
claimed costs.210 
 The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA-81) cre-
ated the Disproportionate Share Hospital Program (DSH), a federally 
funded program that requires states to identify and reimburse hospitals 
that provide a disproportionate level of care to indigent patients.211 
DSH was designed to help hospitals that serve large numbers of Medi-
caid and indigent patients.212 Because Congress designed DSH to alle-
viate the aggregated costs of providing care to indigent patients, this 
program differs from the other federally funded programs because re-
imbursement is not tied directly to individual patients.213 Upon receipt 
from the federal government, states are required to distribute DSH 
funds to qualifying hospitals and medical centers.214 There is no restric-
                                                                                                                      
EMTALA requires hospitals to provide additional services that are non-reimbursable under 
Emergency Medicaid. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396b(v)(3), 1395dd(e)(1). For example, the 
screening and post-stabilization care mandated under EMTALA are forms of care which 
the absence of may not necessarily place the patient’s life in jeopardy, seriously impair 
bodily functions, or cause serious dysfunction of a bodily organ. See id.; Uncompensated 
Care in Southwest Border Counties, supra note 23, at 52. 
207 § 1396b(v)(2)(B). Different states have different eligibility criteria for Medicaid en-
rollment. See Uncompensated Care in Southwest Border Counties, supra note 23, at 
13 tbl.2.3. For example, to be eligible in 2002, the maximum level of income for a family of 
three in California was $15,708 compared with only $4740 in Texas. Id. 
208 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(2)(B) (2000). 
209 Uncompensated Care in Southwest Border Counties, supra note 23, at 12. 
210 See § 1396d(b). 
211 See Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2173, 95 Stat. 357, 808 
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-4 (2000)). 
212 Teresa A. Coughlin et al., Reforming the Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital Pro-
gram, 22 Health Care Financing Rev. 137, 137 (2000). 
213 Uncompensated Care in Southwest Border Counties, supra note 23, at 14. 
214 See Coughlin, supra note 212, at 138. DSH provides considerable latitude to states in 
determining qualification criteria. Id. However, a state must grant eligibility to medical 
providers that provide a certain minimum level of care to the indigent. See § 1396r-4(c)(2); 
Coughlin, supra note 212, at 138--39. 
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tion on using DSH funds to reimburse hospitals for providing treat-
ment to undocumented or PRWOA non-qualifying immigrants.215 
 The most recent of the three programs, the Medication Moderni-
zation Act of 2003 (MMA), provides $1 billion over fiscal years 2005 to 
2008 directly to medical providers to reimburse them for emergency 
care delivered to undocumented immigrants.216 Two-thirds of the $250 
million per year is allotted for use in all states, based upon each state’s 
relative share of the nation’s total undocumented immigrant popula-
tion.217 The remaining one-third provides additional relief to medical 
providers in the six states with the highest number of undocumented 
immigrant apprehensions by federal authorities.218 Thus, medical pro-
viders in states with low numbers of undocumented immigrants and 
apprehensions receive less than $12,000 annually compared to medical 
providers in those states with high numbers of undocumented immi-
grants and apprehensions, such as California, Texas, and Arizona, 
which receive between $40--70 million annually.219 Under MMA, the 
Secretary of the Health and Human Services pays reimbursement 
funds directly to hospitals and medical providers based on their indi-
vidual expenditures.220 Additionally, advanced payments may be re-
quested quarterly based on each emergency care provider’s anticipated 
expenditures.221 
 Despite the presence of federal and state reimbursement pro-
grams, many hospitals are suffering an economic crisis due, in part, to 
large uncompensated and underpayment costs.222 A recent estimate 
from California suggests that the state provided approximately $700 
million of care to undocumented immigrants in 2006, with just $73 mil-
lion in reimbursement from the federal government.223 High levels of 
                                                                                                                      
215 See Uncompensated Care in Southwest Border Counties, supra note 23, at 14. 
216 See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, 
Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1011(a)(1), 117 Stat. 2066, 2432 (to be codified in scattered sec-
tions of 26, 42 U.S.C.). 
217 Id. 
218 § 1011(b), 117 Stat. at 2432–33. The six states with the highest number of appre-
hensions are Arizona, Texas, California, New Mexico, Florida, and New York. See Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Studies, FY 2007 State Al-
locations For Section 1011 of the Medicare Modernization Act 1--2 (2006), avail-
able at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/UndocAliens/downloads/fy07_state_alloc.pdf. 
219 See Dep’t Health & Human Servs., supra note 218, at 1--2 (revealing that Maine, 
Montana, North Dakota, and Vermont were each allocated $11,923 for fiscal year 2007). 
220 See Siskin, supra note 202, at 10. 
221 See § 1011(a)(1), 117 Stat. at 2432; Siskin, supra note 202, at 10. 
222 See Uncompensated Care in Southwest Border Counties, supra note 23, at 47. 
223 See Nicole Gaouette, Plan to Cut Hospital Funds Draws Uproar: Border States Stood to 
Lose Federal Aid for Care of Illegal Immigrants, L.A. Times, Mar. 15, 2007, at A1 (noting that a 
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uncompensated and underpayment costs are a result of many fac-
tors.224 Hospitals complain that demonstrating an immigrant’s un-
documented status is both time-consuming and challenging.225 Un-
documented immigrants are often reluctant to provide information 
about their status for fear of deportation.226 Some hospitals choose not 
to ask patients their immigration status, which means that the hospital 
is foreclosed from seeking reimbursement under either Emergency 
Medicaid or MMA.227 
 Each program has flaws that hinder health care providers from 
recouping the cost of care provided to undocumented and PRWOA 
non-qualified immigrants.228 Emergency Medicaid provides no reim-
bursement for care provided to immigrants who fail to meet state 
Medicaid eligibility.229 Additionally, EMTALA mandates more extensive 
care than that which is reimbursable under Emergency Medicaid.230 
While in theory DSH allows medical providers to recover costs associ-
ated with providing care to undocumented immigrants, its primary 
function is to reimburse medical providers for providing charity care to 
uninsured citizens.231 As a result, DSH funding has historically offset 
only a fraction of uncompensated care costs.232 Even MMA, a program 
designed specifically to reimburse hospitals that provide care to un-
documented immigrants, is not achieving its maximum impact.233 Dur-
ing the two fiscal years 2005 and 2006, $233 of the $500 million avail-
able went unused.234 In Illinois, just six percent of the $12 million 
                                                                                                                      
legislative proposal to reduce federal reimbursement funds has angered many border state 
lawmakers). 
224 See Uncompensated Care in Southwest Border Counties, supra note 23, at 43--44. 
225 See id. at 43. 
226 See id. at 44. 
227 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(2)(B) (2000); Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, 
and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1011(a)(1), 117 Stat. 2066, 2432 
(to be codified in scattered sections of 26, 42 U.S.C.); Fletcher, supra note 152 (noting that 
Sacramento County has a “Don’t Ask” policy regarding immigration status). 
228 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601--1646 (2000). 
229 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v); Uncompensated Care in Southwest Border Counties, 
supra note 23, at 44 (noting that many single men do not meet eligibility because state 
Medicaid programs are restricted to single-parent families with dependent children, preg-
nant women, children, elderly, and the disabled). 
230 See §§ 1395dd, 1396b(v); Uncompensated Care in Southwest Border Counties, 
supra note 23, at 52. 
231 See Uncompensated Care in Southwest Border Counties, supra note 23, at 14. 
232 Id. 
233 See Franklin & Japsen, supra note 204 (noting that federal officials cannot explain 
why communities have not sought out the funds appropriated under MMA). 
234 Gaouette, supra note 223 (noting that despite low utilization in fiscal years 2005 and 
2006, the number of hospitals making claims has increased steadily). 
430 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 28:401 
available annually under the program had been spent three quarters of 
the way into year 2006.235 Reasons cited for hospitals’ tepid response to 
MMA funds include the time consuming paperwork, lower recalcula-
tion costs by the federal government that reduces hospitals’ claims, and 
concerns about providing the government with immigration informa-
tion that might scare undocumented immigrants from seeking needed 
care.236 The funding programs’ inherent limitations, coupled with ad-
ministrative burdens and moral concerns, have resulted in hospitals 
being unable to fully utilize the allotted funding made available by the 
federal government.237 
C. PRWOA’s Lasting Legacy 
 One of PRWOA’s most important changes is its dramatic shift in 
transferring decisions regarding immigrant eligibility for public benefits 
from the federal to the state level.238 Along with this decision-making 
authority, PRWOA brought about significant cost-shifting from the fed-
eral to the local level in the provision of medical care to immigrants.239 
Because PRWOA restricts states’ ability to provide non-emergency care 
to unqualified and undocumented immigrants, hospitals are forbidden 
from providing the most cost- and medically-effective care.240 PRWOA’s 
financial strain on U.S. hospitals is illustrated through the steady in-
crease in uncompensated care and underpayment of care, that are, in 
part, symptoms of a growing immigrant population.241 Certainly, states 
are free to pass post-PRWOA affirmative laws that can restore the ability 
of hospitals and medical centers to provide non-emergency care to im-
                                                                                                                      
235 Franklin & Japsen, supra note 204. 
236 See id. The New York City health network, the country’s largest public health sys-
tem, announced that it would forgo MMA funds because of its desire to protect patient 
confidentiality. Id. 
237 See Uncompensated Care in Southwest Border Counties, supra note 23, at 43--44. 
238 See Hull, supra note 122, at 486 (asserting that Congress transferred authority to the 
states to design, implement, and determine eligibility for most public benefits). 
239 See Uncompensated Care in Southwest Border Counties, supra note 23, at 47 
(finding that states and local governments have absorbed many of the costs associated with 
providing emergency care to undocumented immigrants). 
240 See Care for Immigrants, supra note 21, at 1 (discussing the cost benefits of pre-
ventive care in the context of prenatal and diabetes care). 
241 See Fed’n for Am. Immigration Reform, The Sinking Lifeboat: Uncontrolled 
Immigration & the U.S. Health Care System 3 (2004), available at http://www.fairus. 
org/site/DocServer/healthcare.pdf (noting that more than half of all counties surveyed 
reported that immigration is partially responsible for rises in uncompensated heath care 
costs). 
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migrants.242 However, given the current anti-immigrant political climate, 
it is unlikely that many states will do so.243 Furthermore, because non-
emergency care must be funded without any federal funds, states and 
local governments will nevertheless carry the burden of providing pre-
ventive care should a state decide to pass an affirmative law.244 
 Congress’s current funding programs, and the resulting adminis-
trative hurdles, have been unable to alleviate the immense cost-shift to 
the local level.245 As the congressional opponents to PRWOA correctly 
hypothesized, the Act has effectuated an unfunded mandate that re-
quires the states to carry the financial burden of an inadequate federal 
immigration policy.246 MMA calls into question the efficacy of PRWOA 
given that Congress explicitly intended to reduce the financial burden 
that immigrants place on the public benefit system.247 Studies revealing 
that immigrants utilize health care services less than their citizen coun-
terparts further question whether restricting access to comprehensive 
health care actually reduces the alleged burden immigrants place on 
the American economy and people.248 Rather, these studies suggest 
that immigrants do not overburden America’s health care system.249 In 
light of the current economic reality, PRWOA’s restriction on immi-
grant access to health care cannot be seen as effective public policy.250 
IV. Proposed Solutions 
 PRWOA is a major public health blunder.251 One commentator 
has remarked that identifying a growing population known to have 
high communicable disease and fertility rates, denying them access to 
                                                                                                                      
242 See 8 U.S.C. § 1622(d) (2000). 
243 See Fed’n for Am. Immigration Reform, supra note 241, at 11 (noting that many 
states are curtailing public benefits to reduce state deficits); Hull, supra note 122, at 488 (stat-
ing that states committed to caring for welfare of immigrants may be unwilling or unable to 
provide care, especially if this would reduce care to citizens or lead to higher taxes). 
244 See § 1622(d) (allowing for state or local public benefits only upon passage of af-
firmative state law); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 285.201 (Vernon Supp. 2006) 
(allowing non-emergency care to undocumented and non-qualified PRWOA immigrants 
only if such care is funded locally). 
245 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396b(v), 1396r-4 (2000); Medicare Prescription Drug, Improve-
ment, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1011, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) 
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246 See 142 Cong. Rec. 20721 (1996) (statement of Rep. Bentsen). 
247 See 8 U.S.C. § 1601(4); § 1011, 117 Stat. at 2066. 
248 See, e.g., Goldman et al., supra note 25, at 1708--09. 
249 See id. (evaluating costs compared to percentage of the overall population). 
250 See Uncompensated Care in Southwest Border Counties, supra note 23, at 47. 
251 See Costich, supra note 16, at 1043. 
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care other than emergency services, and devoting as little funding as 
possible “sounds like every public health practitioner’s worst night-
mare.”252 PRWOA is flawed in two respects: first, its prohibition on pre-
ventive care unnecessarily restricts local medical providers from provid-
ing the most meaningful care; and second, inadequate federal funding 
has resulted in significant economic distress for America’s public health 
care providers.253 It is time to end PRWOA’s draconian restrictions on 
providing public benefits to immigrants; the federal government must 
increase funding so as to provide hospitals and community health care 
centers with appropriate resources to address this country’s growing 
health care crisis.254 Through an analysis of a workable alternative to 
the current statutory regime, this note concludes by highlighting the 
need for flexibility that will be essential in addressing the complex is-
sues associated with providing and funding immigrant medical care.255 
A. Repeal PRWOA’s Restrictions on Immigrant Access to Preventive Care 
 A natural first step in improving both immigrant health access and 
hospital solvency is to repeal PRWOA’s provision restricting immigrant 
access to public benefits, specifically publicly funded preventive health 
care.256 PRWOA is an unnecessary piece of legislation that restricts 
hospitals and medical providers from providing the best possible medi-
cal care to immigrants.257 Repealing PRWOA would reinstate a medical 
practitioner’s right to choose to provide preventive care to any patient 
who seeks such care.258 Repealing PRWOA would not create an affirma-
tive duty on practitioners to provide preventive care to all immi-
grants.259 Rather, repeal comports with the reality that medical provid-
ers at the local level are in a better position to anticipate the medical 
needs of their own communities than the federal government.260 
 Admittedly, PRWOA already allows states to override the restric-
tion on providing public benefits to immigrants by affirmatively passing 
                                                                                                                      
252 Id. 
253 See id. at 1069 (asserting that repealing bans on providing care to immigrants alone 
is not the answer but rather, state and federal governments need to identify additional 
funding resources). 
254 See Alteras et al., supra note 72, at 1; Costich, supra note 16, at 1069. 
255 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601--1646 (2000); Alteras et al., supra note 72, at 1. 
256 See Costich, supra note 16, at 1069. 
257 See Yardley, supra note 26. 
258 See §§ 1601--1646. 
259 See id. 
260 See Alteras et al., supra note 72, at 1 (“[T]he ability of communities to address this 
growing [medical] crisis is critical.”). 
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a subsequent state law.261 However, a more prudent approach is to rec-
ognize that PRWOA is bad policy and repeal its anti-immigrant provi-
sions outright.262 By allowing states to opt out of PRWOA’s mandate, 
PRWOA does not create an absolute ban on providing medical care to 
immigrants.263 Rather, it simply, but unfortunately, mandates the pas-
sage of affirmative legislation to allow practitioners to continue to pro-
vide medical care to immigrants.264 This creates a significant and un-
necessary burden on local and state governments to spend valuable 
resources and energy in order to pass legislation, the ultimate effect of 
which is to maintain the status quo.265 Furthermore, because it appears 
that many medical providers are simply ignoring PRWOA and provid-
ing non-emergency care to immigrants regardless of whether they are 
“qualified aliens,” the effectiveness of the PRWOA statutory regime is 
questionable.266 
 While repeal of PRWOA is an important first step, the federal gov-
ernment must also commit additional funding to hospitals and other 
medical centers that provide care to immigrants.267 Even if states, react-
ing to PRWOA, reaffirmed practitioners’ ability to provide preventive 
care to non-qualified immigrants, inadequate federal funding limits the 
capacity of local communities to provide the authorized care.268 Given 
that the current federal funding system does not provide adequate re-
imbursement for the mandated level of care under EMTALA, any at-
tempt at solving increasing hospital insolvency requires a more firm 
commitment from the federal government to fund medical care.269 An 
important first step for the federal government in helping to meet the 
economic void that has resulted under PRWOA is to invest in commu-
nity-based programs that aim to reduce long-term health care costs, as 
well as improve health outcomes.270 
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B. An Innovative and Successful Approach: The Alliance Family  
and Group Care Program 
 The Alliance Family and Group Care program in Alameda County, 
California provides an insightful example of success in combining pub-
lic and private funds to provide greater access to preventive care that 
ultimately reduces long term health costs.271 The Alliance Program is a 
not-for-profit managed care program that, in essence, is publicly sup-
ported health insurance.272 Responding to disparities in accessing 
health care within the county, Alliance created its program in an at-
tempt to fill the preventive care gap.273 The program provides access to 
comprehensive preventive health care services, including vision and 
dental care, through a primary care provider chosen by the enrollee.274 
The Alliance Program is funded primarily by private funds, although it 
does receive some state contributions.275 
 The Alliance Program is but one of many examples of alternative 
community health care models that can “make preventive and primary 
care services available to low-income people, improve health outcomes, 
and thereby reduce costs in the long run.”276 However, sustainable fi-
nancing is a major problem facing these community-based programs.277 
The federal government would be wise to invest in community move-
ments that may ultimately provide workable programs for wider re-
form.278 Such programs offer a more balanced approach to addressing 
health care issues facing immigrants primarily because the programs 
can be tailored to the individual needs of the local community.279 
                                                                                                                      
271 See id. at 1, 10--13. 
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Conclusion 
 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 
unnecessarily eliminated the ability of many immigrants to access 
public benefits.280 Looking at the goal of PRWOA through the lens of 
congressional intent has shown that the measure was an attempt to 
reduce the alleged burden that immigrants place on the U.S. welfare 
system.281 Studies reveal that immigration trends are on an upswing 
and that both the legally residing and undocumented immigrant 
populations are at their highest levels in decades.282 Because PRWOA 
forbids hospitals and medical practitioners from providing publicly 
supported preventive care, immigrants’ minor medical conditions are 
more likely to turn into emergency conditions resulting in the need 
for an emergency room visit.283 Emergency care is expensive and 
many providers are unable to obtain adequate reimbursement for 
services rendered in compliance with the federal EMTALA man-
date.284 Given this economic reality, fundamental change is needed in 
the federal government’s approach to solving the issues surrounding 
immigrant medical care access.285 Repealing PRWOA and allowing for 
greater flexibility in providing preventive care to immigrants, coupled 
with increases in federal funding, may provide a more appropriate 
and workable solution than the current statutory framework.286 
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